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According to a popular version of social capital theory, civic engagement should produce generalized trust
among citizens. We put this theory to the test by examining the causal connection between civic engagement and
generalized trust using multiple methods and multiple (prospective) panel datasets. We found participants to be
more trusting. This was mostly likely caused by selection effects: the causal effects of civic engagement on trust
were very small or nonsignificant. In the cases where small causal effects were found, they turned out not to last.
We found no differences across types of organizations and only minor variations across countries.
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Generalized or social trust is an important ingredient for positive human relationships. Trusting
individuals are more satisfied with their lives (Alvarez-Díaz, González, & Radcliff, 2010; Helliwell,
2003), have more positive social relationships (Ferres, Connell, & Travaglione, 2004), perform better
in education (John, 2005), and are in better health (Fujiwara & Kawachi, 2008a, 2008b). Trust also
seems important at the macro level: nations with high levels of trust have lower levels of corruption
(Uslaner, 2002), a higher quality of government (Bjørnskov, 2006), lower levels of crime (Halpern,
2001; Rosenfeld, Messner, & Baumer, 2001), higher levels of participation in elections (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997) and higher levels of economic growth (Dearmon &
Grier, 2009; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000).
Whether the above mentioned correlations actually represent causal relations is something that
is, and should be, disputed, but it seems safe to state that trust is something worth investing in,
something we would like to maintain, or, if possible, enhance. According to a popular version of
social capital theory, civic engagement—such as membership of voluntary associations or
volunteering—offers a way to accomplish this (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Claibourn & Martin, 2000;
Jennings & Stoker, 2004; Paxton, 2007). Moreover, some claim that the relation between the two is
reciprocal: “[. . .] civic engagement, and trust are mutually reinforcing” (Putnam, 2000, p. 137), or
in other words: civic engagement leads to increased generalized trust, and this higher level of trust
in turn increases the inclination to participate in voluntary associations. In this view, voluntary
associations and the like are assumed to be a special type of social network, which composition is
heterogeneous, where activities are typically cooperative, and where participants’ sentiments are
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usually positive due to the fact that the voluntarily chosen activities they perform represent their
interests and/or hobbies.
Empirically, many issues remain unresolved in this line of research. One of those issues is that
the causality of the relation between trust and civic engagement has not been examined thoroughly.
The vast majority of studies are based on cross-sectional data. As we argue more fully in the
theoretical section, there are pressing reasons to investigate the relationship between trust and civic
engagement longitudinally. There are several plausible selection effects that pose a threat to previous
conclusions about civic engagement and trust. Our main aim in the current article is therefore to find
out whether civic engagement indeed causes trust, and if so, what kind of civic engagement is the
most productive. To do so we consult five different (prospective) panel datasets from four different
countries, and we employ strict, dynamic models to test the relationship under different circum-
stances. We contribute to the literature by answering three questions: (1) To what extent does civic
engagement enhance generalized trust? (2) Does the increase of generalized trust occur immediately,
or does it need some time to emerge? (3) Is the effect of civic engagement on generalized trust
different across countries and types of voluntary associations?
Theory
Rotter (1967) defined trust as the “expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word,
promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon” (p. 651). In
exchange situations, trust is helpful: it lowers transaction costs, and goals may be attained more
efficiently when there is mutual help (Coleman, 1990). This results in repeated transactions and
further enhancement of interpersonal trust. However, social interactions also occur between parties
that do not know each other. In those cases, generalized trust—defined by Stolle (2001a) as “an
abstract preparedness to trust others and to engage in actions with others” (p. 205)—facilitates
cooperation. In the next section, we explain why many scholars are interested in this type of trust, and
why some of them assert that civic engagement breeds generalized trust.
Why Civic Engagement Furthers Generalized Trust: Socialization
The origin of the argument that civic engagement promotes trust is the classic work of Alexis de
Tocqueville, who argued that the best way to align the divergent interests of people towards the
common good is to have them participate in democratic decision making (Tocqueville, 1835–40/
2000). Such participation not only occurs in local politics but also in voluntary associations. Thus,
one of the propositions in this “Tocquevillean paradigm” (Warren, 2001) is that through interactions
in “secondary associations,” people learn to bridge differences, subscribe to democratic values more
strongly, and learn how to organize collective action. Putnam (2000), who is probably the most
well-known advocate of this school, stresses the value of leisure associations in this regard (such as
the celebrated bowling club) because of their horizontal organization and extensive face-to-face
interaction. He claims that: “Internally, associations and less formal networks of civic engagement
instill in their members habits of cooperation and public spiritedness, as well as the practical skills
necessary to partake in public life” (2000, p. 338). Generalized (or social) trust is an essential part
of cooperation and an indicator of that public spiritedness.
According to this reasoning, voluntary associations are a special kind of social networks because
of the nature of their activities and the freely chosen participation, which create “[. . .] opportunities
for positive experiences with others under the ‘controlled’ circumstances of shared interest” (Anheier
& Kendall, 2002, p. 350). The positive experiences with others are in turn expected to influence
mental dispositions, such as values and attitudes, and possibly also generalized trust. In the political
socialization literature, these “beneficial formative effects” (Rosenblum, 1998, p. 48) of voluntary
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associations are often referred to as spill-over effects. The mechanisms of the proposed spill-over
effect strongly resemble an idea that is known in social psychology as the contact hypothesis. In this
literature, it is examined how certain interactions can positively adjust stereotypes and prejudices,
breaking down social categorizations of in- and out-group (Brewer & Gaertner, 2001; Rothbart,
2001). In the original formulation, it was argued that this process is stimulated when: (1) integration
has the support of authority, fostering social norms that favor intergroup acceptance, (2) the situation
has high acquaintance potential, promoting intimate contact among members of both groups, (3) the
contact situation promotes equal status interactions among members of the social groups, and (4) the
situation creates conditions of cooperative interdependence among members of both groups (Allport,
1954). A recent review of research on the contact hypothesis yielded considerable support for the
contact hypothesis (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).
Voluntary associations and organizations are contexts that meet Allport’s criteria relatively
well. Trust can be seen as a positive expectation about people’s intentions in social-dilemma
situations. Within a voluntary association, a participant often experiences that his fellow participants
are keeping their promises, are exhibiting willingness to cooperate, and are sacrificing personal
resources for the public good. In other words, the positive expectation of trust is reinforced.
Why Civic Engagement Does Not Further Generalized Trust
The hypothesis that civic engagement fosters trust has been challenged both on theoretical as
well as on methodological grounds (Nannestad, 2008; Sturgis, Patulny, & Allum, 2009; Uslaner,
2002). Uslaner is the fiercest critic of the socialization hypothesis and calls the view that civic
engagement can create trust simply “a mistake” (Uslaner, 2002, p. 4). We discuss the theoretical
arguments first and deal with the methodological issues later. Trust is a fairly stable personality trait
of individuals, Uslaner argues, and it is established in individuals before they start participating in
organizations. This view is supported by a wealth of evidence. Trust is indeed a fairly stable
personality characteristic of persons (Bekkers, 2012; Bleidorn, Kandler, Riemann, Angleitner, &
Spinath, 2009; Claibourn & Martin, 2000; Uslaner, 2002), even in adolescence (Flanagan & Gallay,
2008; Flanagan & Stout, 2010). Recently, twin studies have provided evidence for the idea that trust
may also have a substantial genetic component (Hiraishi, Yamagata, Shikishima, & Ando, 2008;
Shikishima, Hiraishi, & Ando, 2006; Sturgis et al., 2010). Though the fact that trust is heritable does
not rule out the possibility that trust is also influenced by civic engagement, it does limit the scope
for socialization effects.
People who assume that other people are fundamentally honest and willing to cooperate are
more likely to think that the goals of voluntary associations can be reached by working together.
Because they are less likely to think that the collective effort will fail, they are more likely to
contribute (Kerr & Harris, 1996). Laboratory studies reveal that trust facilitates cooperation in a
variety of social-dilemma situations (Brann & Foddy, 1987; De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001;
Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn, 1996; Wrightsman, 1992). Trust is a helpful predisposition because
the decision to trust causes others to reciprocate that trust (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Rotter, 1967).
In sum, it takes trust to engage in social relationships and to make them productive. Thus, trust is
likely to be an important precondition for civic engagement.
Stolle (2001a) concluded that “people who trust more self-select into certain types of associa-
tions” (p. 233) after she failed to find a relationship between length of membership and trust. In line
with this argument, Bekkers and Bowman (2009) recently showed that decisions to start and stop
volunteering are dependent on preceding levels of trust. Specifically, people with higher levels of
trust are more likely to start volunteering and less likely to quit than people with lower levels of trust.
Taking such selection processes into account potentially reduces the estimated effect of civic
engagement on trust. A similar finding emerges from studies on the contact hypothesis: because
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prejudice reduces contact, a failure to take selection into account leads to an overestimation of the
effect of contact on prejudice (Binder et al., 2009).
Although the evidence of selection into and out of volunteering based on trust seems convincing,
it does not necessarily rule out the possibility that civic engagement furthers trust. Even fairly stable
personality traits of individuals are open to change (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000; Roberts &
Mroczek, 2008). In fact, when advocates of virtuous circles of civic engagement are correct, both
processes should occur. However, additional issues have been raised that are likely to constrain the
impact of civic engagement on trust. One problem is that the impact of civic engagement on the lives
of most people is generally not very great (Newton, 1999). Much more time is spent in the context
of work, the household, or more informal types of social interaction (Van Ingen, 2008). This raises
the question of whether the experiences in voluntary associations are salient enough to change
people’s mental dispositions, which could be one of the reasons why spill-over effects are not often
found (Stolle, 2001a). A second issue is that the idea that voluntary associations represent pleasurable
interactions in a heterogeneous social context may be overoptimistic (Roßteutscher, 2005). This idea
is also supported by empirical findings: in a rare study of the social networks of voluntary associa-
tions McPherson and Smith-Lovin (1987) found that interactions between people with dissimilar
backgrounds are the exception, and homophily tends to be the rule.
Previous Research
Previous studies on the association between trust and civic engagement have almost exclusively
used cross-sectional survey data. Virtually all of these studies found a positive relation between civic
engagement and trust, although the strength of the relationship may vary across countries (Delhey &
Newton, 2003). Pichler and Wallace (2007) found trust to be closely related to voluntary association
membership in the European countries they studied.
The results of previous research are consistent with the hypothesis that trust increases with civic
engagement. Members of voluntary associations display higher levels of trust than nonmembers
(Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Claibourn & Martin, 2000; Paxton, 2007; Sønderskov, 2010; Stolle, 1998,
2001b; Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Wollebæk & Strømsnes, 2008). In addition, individuals who are
actively participating in voluntary associations tend to have higher levels of trust than passive
members (Welch, Sikkink, & Loveland, 2007; Wollebæk & Strømsnes, 2008). Finally, people who
volunteer for nonprofit organizations tend to display higher levels of trust than nonvolunteers
(Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Brown, 1999; Caputo, 2009).
As far as we know, only four studies have been published that used panel data to test the effect
of civic engagement on trust. Claibourn and Martin (2000) analyzed data from the Michigan
Socialization Study, spanning a considerable period of time (1965–82). The authors found a weakly
positive effect of membership on trust, but a negative effect of a lagged membership variable, while
no effect of trust on membership was found.
In the second study, changes in trust over a period of nine months were examined in a national
telephone survey of Americans (Gross, Aday, & Brewer, 2004). The study found that volunteering
was not correlated with social trust when a lagged trust variable was included. Without the lagged
trust variable, however, volunteering was a significant predictor of trust.
The third study examined the longitudinal relationship between engagement in volunteering and
generalized trust in a biennial panel study spanning six years among a national sample of adults in
the Netherlands (Bekkers, 2012). The study showed that changes in volunteering are not related to
changes in trust. The results also show that trust is higher among volunteers mainly because of
selective exit: persons with low trust are more likely to quit volunteering. While this study casts
considerable doubt on the existence of a virtuous circle linking civic engagement to trust, it did not
investigate the more common forms of civic engagement such as memberships. Also, the level of
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panel attrition from the survey was relatively high, limiting the potential to detect longitudinal effects
of volunteering.
Finally, Jennings and Stoker (2004) used longitudinal cohort data to test the effects of different
types of involvement on trust and vice versa. They found many insignificant effects, which is
probably partly due to the long time between the measures (8, 9, and 15 years). They did not use
panel models though: neither the dependent nor the independent variables captured (within-person)
changes (in trust and involvement).
How the Current Study Improves on Previous Studies
The main threat to the validity of the conclusion that civic engagement enhances generalized
trust in studies based on cross-sectional data is that there are many plausible third variables
that could cause a spurious relation. Some of these factors are commonly measured (e.g., educa-
tion), and some of them are usually not measured (e.g., personality traits or prosocial values).
Therefore, a solid empirical test should take into account this observed and unobserved hetero-
geneity. Fixed-effects and first-difference (change score) regression models solve part of the het-
erogeneity problem, by controlling for time-invariant effects (Allison, 2009). This makes these
techniques currently the best option when analyzing the relation between civic engagement and
trust.
In our models, we employ fixed-effects regression and an adapted version of first-difference
regression. The latter is discussed in technical terms in the data and methods section, but con-
ceptually it boils down to comparing the change in trust of those who start participation in a
voluntary association with the change in trust of those who remain nonparticipants (a [quasi-]
control group). If the argument about civic engagement is correct, one should observe an increase
in trust (relative to the change in trust in the reference group) after the “event” of entering an
association. In our view, this approach is conceptually clearer than fixed-effects regression, as it
does not assume that exit effects are similar to entry effects and does not assume that every
additional membership adds the same amount of trust. However, fixed-effects regression has the
advantage of more statistical power. We therefore present the results of both types of analyses in
the results section.
This article contributes to the literature not only by conducting a stricter and clearer statistical
test. We also identify four sources of variation that create further opportunities to test the civic-
engagement-furthers-trust hypothesis. First, we examine two types of civic engagement: member-
ship of voluntary associations and volunteering. Second, we examine an immediate effect (after 0.5
year of participation on average) and a somewhat later effect (after 1.5 years of participation on
average). Third, we analyze different types of voluntary associations. And fourth, we study different
countries.
Data and Methods
For most analyses, we used the data of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). These data have
several advantages: a large number of waves, a consistent design, and high-quality measures. We
provide a detailed description below. We performed analyses on other datasets to examine whether
the relationships observed in the Swiss data are observed in other countries as well. Though many
datasets include measures of trust and civic engagement, we only used datasets that (1) were panel
data (with at least two waves) and (2) were nationally representative. The following datasets
met these criteria: the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the Giving in the Netherlands
Panel Survey (GINPS), the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS), and the
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Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey (HILDA). For a description of these
surveys, we refer to their websites.1
Swiss Household Panel (SHP)
The SHP aims to study “the dynamics of changing living conditions and representations in the
population of Switzerland” (Voorpostel et al., 2009, p. 3), by way of a yearly survey which started
in 1999. Because trust was not included in the first waves of the study, we use the second sample of
the panel—which was taken in 2004—consisting of 3,654 individuals from 2,538 households. Our
analyses include five waves of measurement (2004–2008). The participation rate in the last round
was still 66% (or 2,410 individuals). The attrition was found to be correlated with factors such as age,
having children, citizenship, political and social participation, and satisfaction, although compared
to other representative panel surveys, the SHP is “[. . .] not particularly selective with respect to
important socio-demographic or -economic variables” (Lipps, 2007, 63). It also seems unlikely that
this selective attrition biased our findings, because the analyses we used are unaffected by omitted
time-invariant factors (such as several of the abovementioned variables; see explanation below).
Dependent Variable
Generalized trust was measured with the following question: “Would you say that most people can
be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” It was followed by answer categories
0 (“Can’t be too careful”) to 10 (“Most people can be trusted”). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics
of the most important variables in the SHP data. The average level of trust was 5.7.
Independent Variables
We analyzed two forms of civic engagement: voluntary association membership and volunteer-
ing. Membership of voluntary associations was measured with the question: “I will now read out a
list of associations and organizations. Could you tell me if for each of them you are an active
member, a passive member or not a member?” The answer categories were the following: (1) local
or parents association, (2) sports or leisure association, (3) organization involved in cultural activi-
ties, music, or education, (4) syndicate, employees association, (5) political party, (6) organization
concerned with protection of the environment, (7) charitable organization, (8) women’s association,
and (9) tenants’ rights association. Our membership variable is a count of (any type of) memberships
in these associations. On average, the SHP respondents reported 1.5 memberships.
Volunteering was measured with the question “Do you have honorary or voluntary activities
within an association, an organization or an institution?” (yes / no), which was accompanied by the
following explanation: “Voluntary activities relating to private initiative, such as helping neighbors,
at local fetes are not included here; payments for meetings, expenses or payment of symbolic
amounts are not considered as forms of remuneration” (Swiss Household Panel, 2010, p. 332). Of the
SHP respondents, 33% reported volunteering activities.
The distinction between membership and volunteering is relevant, since they generally represent
different types of activities. Volunteering is often seen as a more demanding and productive kind of
participation (Wilson, 2000). However, this should not necessarily lead to more positive participation
effects, since this kind of participation also comes with more obligations and duties, which may not
always be positive experiences.
1 BHPS: http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/survey/bhps; GINPS: http://giving.nl/; LISS: http://www.lissdata.nl/lissdata/; HILDA:
http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/hilda/.
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Control Variables
“Education” was constructed as a quasi-continuous variable with 11 categories of achieved or
current educational levels, ranging from incomplete compulsory school (0) to university (10).
“Partner” is a dummy variable that captures whether respondents had a partner, regardless of whether
they were living together or not. The health variable represents respondents’ self-assessed overall
health on a 4-point scale: (1) “not well at all” / “not very well,”2 (2) “so, so (average),” (3) “well,”
(4) “very well.” “Employed” is a dummy variable that captures the difference between being actively
employed (1) versus being unemployed or not in the labor force (0). Prior research has demonstrated
that all of these variables relate to both trust and civic participation, which means that one runs the
risk of finding spurious effects without the proper controls.
Analytical Strategy
We used several types of regression analysis to examine the relation between civic engagement
and trust. First, to mimic analyses based on cross-sectional data, we perform between-regressions,
which are based on the (within-person) averages of civic engagement and trust (across waves, for
each respondent). In other words, these analyses only use between-person variation.
Second, we perform fixed-effects regression, which is based on within-person variation (i.e.,
variation over time) only, which is the preferred technique of analyzing panel data when selection
2 These categories were combined because very few respondents indicated feeling “not well at all.”
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics SHP (pooled)
N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Obs./(persons)
Generalized trust 13,564 (4,445) 5.724 2.477 0 10
between 2.234
within 1.366
Volunteering (dummy) 13,629 (4,452) 0.324 0.468 0 1
Membership (count) 13,631 (4,451) 1.528 1.400 0 5
Education 16,486 (4,455) 4.813 3.041 0 10
Health 13,658 (4,453) 4.053 0.673 2 5
Employed 13,658 (4,455) 0.697 0.459 0 1
Partner 13,624 (4,451) 0.733 0.443 0 1
Transitions Volunteering Membership
N/(%) N/(%)
Two-wave
Stay uninvolved (00) 4,910 (58) 1,485 (18)
Entry (01) 691 (8) 810 (10)
Exit (10) 675 (8) 791 (9)
Stay involved (11) 2141 (25) 5,333 (63)
Three-wave
Stay uninvolved (000) 2,832 (53) 668 (12)
Entry (011) 236 (4) 304 (6)
Exit (100) 264 (5) 224 (4)
Stay involved (111) 1,177 (22) 3,224 (60)
Late entry (001) 247 (5) 217 (4)
Entry and exit (010) 210 (4) 184 (3)
Note. Some respondents contributed more than one transition to the dataset.
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effects are likely to affect the examined relationship (Allison, 2009). In order to be able to use the
multiple waves of measurement, both the dependent variable and the independent variables are
subtracted from the within-person means of these variables (which is the standard fixed-effects
approach). The difference between the results of the between- and fixed-effects regressions is an
indication of the extent to which selection accounts for the relation between civic engagement and
trust.
Third, we use a first-difference approach (change scores) with different transition groups. The
dependent variable is the change in generalized trust between two consecutive waves (first differ-
ence). Our independent variable is the onset of membership or volunteer work: the group that became
involved is compared to the group that remained uninvolved (a quasi-control group). Since a
respondent can go through more than one of these transitions in five years, ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation of our models would produce biased standard errors (Allison, 2009). We therefore
opted for generalized least squares estimation (using Stata’s xtreg command with the –pa option),
taking into account the correlated errors.
The following are the four possible transitions when two waves of measurement are used:
1) remain uninvolved (T1 = 0; T2 = 0),
2) become involved (T1 = 0; T2 = 1),
3) become uninvolved (T1 = 1; T2 = 0), and
4) remain involved (T1 = 1; T2 = 1).
As Table 1 shows, most people did not change between two waves but remained either partici-
pant or nonparticipant (84% for volunteering; 81% for membership). These proportions are reason-
ably similar across the different datasets we use. Despite the low percentage of respondents that
changed, we still have a considerable number of respondents in the most important transitions, which
is due to the fact that we stacked the different waves (1–2, 2–3, etc.; see below).
The effect of the participation “treatment” then equals the effect in the entry group (B) minus the
effect in the reference group (A) of the uninvolved: ΔTrust(B)—ΔTrust(A). In Table 1, the frequen-
cies of these transitions are displayed. In a subsequent analysis, we also analyze more complicated
transition patterns (three-wave design):
1) Stay uninvolved (000),
2) Entry (011),
3) Exit (100),
4) Stay involved (111),
5) Late Entry (001), and
6) Entry and Exit (010).
Apart from the first differences, we also compute the change in trust in two years time (i.e.,
2006–2004, 2007–2005, and 2008–2006) in the latter transitions. There is little known about the
timing of the effect of civic engagement on trust (in both theory and research). However, since the
theoretical mechanism requires getting to know fellow participants and establishing relationships
with them, the effect cannot occur over night. Also, it seems unlikely that civic engagement would
produce ever more and more trust when participation is prolonged (for more than a few years). In
other words, when theory and common sense are combined, the range of 0.5 to two years of
participation seems the optimal period of testing effects on trust.
There are several ways to model longitudinal multiple-membership effects, with different
strengths and weaknesses. What the most suitable kind of analysis is likely differs across applica-
tions. The key issue is finding the most appropriate way to reduce the information in Table 2, which
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shows the two-wave case with 0–5 memberships for each respondent. With a maximum of five
memberships, there are 36 possible transitions, which is too much to analyze separately with most
data. There are several ways to reduce the information in Table 2. We employ two different methods.
The fixed-effects approach reduces all this information to one parameter: the change in the
membership count. It is important to note that—as a consequence—the fixed-effects regressions have
a few “hidden” theoretical assumptions. First, all the transitions on the diagonal (the grey cells in
Table 2) are assumed to have the same effect. Whether this is theoretically correct depends on
whether late effects are likely to occur. If they do, someone who had four memberships and maintains
those memberships is likely to experience a participation effect, whereas someone who stays
uninvolved (0 → 0 memberships) should obviously show no participation effect. Second, gaining (or
losing) one membership is assumed to have the same effect regardless of the number of initial
memberships, for example going from one to two memberships has the same effect as going from
four to five memberships (the +1s in Table 2). In our case, it seems unlikely that this is true. However,
in practice, if going from four to five memberships has an effect (although smaller than going from
one to two), it may still be desirable to pool those transitions for the sake of power. Third, exit effects
are assumed to have the same effect as entry effects, but then reversed (cf. the +1 and −1 in Table 2).
Unfortunately, we know of little research on exit effects, which makes it hard to judge whether this
is plausible a priori. One could also test these assumptions empirically. However, due to the low
number of cases in the extreme cells, some of the estimates involve a lot of uncertainty. The
fixed-effects approach also has advantages: it is parsimonious and uses all the information in Table 2.
The latter is not true for our second method. The first-difference approach with nonparticipants
as reference group only uses the information in the first row of Table 2: it compares the change in
trust of those who went from zero to at least one membership (cells with the diagonal lines) to the
change in trust of those who remained uninvolved (cell with the horizontal lines). This second
approach is theoretically less restrictive, which probably makes it the preferred approach in many
applications. However, this comes at the expense of power: fewer cases are used to calculate the
effect. This means that if the assumptions of the fixed-effects approach are correct, our first-
difference regression with transition groups is not the preferred method.
Results
Participants Are More Trusting Than Nonparticipants
Figure 1 shows the average generalized trust scores for different categories of respondents,
based on the pooled data of the SHP. Volunteers and nonvolunteers clearly showed different levels of
trust: volunteers were 0.85 (6.30–5.45) points more trusting, which corresponds to a standardized
difference of 0.34 (SDs trust; see Table 1).
Table 2. Change in Membership Count Between Two Waves
2evaW1evaW
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1 +1
2 −1
3
4 +1
5
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Members of voluntary associations were also more trusting than nonmembers, and the differ-
ence was of similar effect size as in the case of volunteering. This result stands in contrast to the
hypothesis that the intensity of civic engagement is positively related to trust. Volunteering is a more
intense form of civic engagement than membership. Note, however, that in this sample, it is
reasonably common to have multiple memberships. The accumulation of memberships is clearly
linked to trust: there is an almost linear relationship between the number of memberships and trust.
The difference between those without memberships and those with five memberships or more is
substantial: 1.91 points trust.
These outcomes strongly support the idea that participants in voluntary associations are more
trusting than nonparticipants and are in line with findings from previous studies based on cross-
sectional data. However, as argued in the previous section, we have to use the longitudinal informa-
tion of the data for a better empirical test.
The between-regressions in Table 3 look at differences between respondents (regression on
pooled averages), similar to Figure 1, but with four control variables added to the model. Without the
controls (not shown in the output), the effects of volunteering and membership were: b = 1.125 and
b = 0.488. The inclusion of the control variables diminished the effect sizes of civic engagement
somewhat (to b = 0.957 for volunteering; b = 0.413 for membership). In other words, the group that
started participating was selective with regard to education, having a partner, health, and employ-
ment. Nonetheless, the effects remain strong: the standardized effect of membership on trust equals
0.26 (0.413 * 1.400 / 2.234), and the standardized dummy effect of volunteering equals 0.43 (0.957
/ 2.234) or 0.20 when fully standardized. Although it is possible to extend this approach by adding
more control variables, it is unlikely that all relevant variables are measured in the survey. A more
efficient method is to use fixed-effects regression, which also controls for unobserved heterogeneity
caused by time-invariant factors.
Civic Engagement Hardly Enhances Trust
The fixed-effects regression model corresponds to our intuitive idea of causality: it examines the
relation between changes in X and changes inY. Comparing the between-regressions and fixed-effects
regressions in Table 3 is instructive: the observed correlation between civic engagement and trust turns
out to be mainly due to between-person variation, not to within-person variation. In other words, the
causal effects, examined in the fixed-effects regressions, are much smaller than the cross-sectional
correlations. And for both volunteering and membership, they are also no longer significant.
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Figure 1. Average generalized trust score by participation (SHP pooled).
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The entry-versus-uninvolved models are the cleanest test of the civic-engagement-enhances-
trust hypothesis. The results are similar to the fixed-effects regression for volunteering but slightly
different for membership. Volunteering did not enhance generalized trust (b = −0.021 n.s). Mem-
bership showed a significant effect on trust (b = 0.178) but again of small effect size (standardized
dummy effect = .08).
In sum, the evidence for a causal effect of civic engagement on generalized trust is limited. We
were unable to find an effect for volunteering and found only a small effect for membership. This is
remarkable given the “conventional wisdom” that volunteering is a stronger form of civic engage-
ment than membership. Despite the statistical significance of the membership effect, its practical
significance can be questioned.
The Initial Increase in Trust Does Not Last
In Table 4, we extend the approach of comparing transition groups to the three-wave case, which
gives us the chance to distinguish between short-term and prolonged participation.
Table 3. Regression of Generalized Trust on Volunteering and Membership (SHP pooled; regression coefficients and
standard errors)
Generalized Trust (volunteering models) Generalized Trust (membership models)
Between-
Regression
Fixed-Effects
Regression
First-Difference
Regression
Between-
Regression
Fixed-Effects
Regression
First-Difference
Regression
Volunteering (dummy) 0.957** −0.053
(0.080) (0.058)
Membership (count) 0.413** 0.037
(0.028) (0.021)
Participation transition:
Remain uninvolved (ref) 0 0
Entry/Start −0.021 0.178*
(0.079) (0.086)
Exit/Quit 0.039 0.038
(0.079) (0.086)
Remain involved −0.000 0.109*
(0.037) (0.045)
Education 0.120** 0.007 0.009 0.089** 0.008 0.007
(0.011) (0.031) (0.005) (0.012) (0.031) (0.005)
Partner −0.244** 0.016 0.012 −0.262** 0.015 0.009
(0.081) (0.077) (0.037) (0.080) (0.077) (0.037)
Health:
not well (ref) 0 0 0 0 0 0
so, so/average 0.367 0.016 0.326* 0.293 0.023 0.310*
(0.296) (0.130) (0.142) (0.201) (0.131) (0.142)
well 1.142** 0.060 0.191 1.109** 0.064 0.173
(0.267) (0.131) (0.129) (0.265) (0.131) (0.129)
very well 1.329** 0.066 0.159 1.278** 0.069 0.138
(0.274) (0.137) (0.132) (0.271) (0.137) (0.132
Employed −0.027 −0.208** 0.138** 0.005 −0.206** 0.133*
(0.081) (0.069) (0.036) (0.080) (0.069) (0.036)
Intercept 3.784** 5.344** 0.141** 3.676 5.263** 0.083
(0.081) (0.207) (0.137) (0.263) (0.209) (0.140)
N (obs/persons) 13,532/4,437 13,532/4,437 8,325/2,971 13,534/4,436 13,534/4,436 8,327/2,971
Note. The fixed-effects regressions (models II and V) are controlled for year of measurement (dummy variables). The
first-difference models (models III and VI) are controlled for “equation number” (1 = 2005–2004, 2 = 2006–2005, etc.).
*p < .05; **p < .01.
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We start with the immediate effects. In line with Table 3, volunteering (model 1) showed no
significant effect, regardless of the transition pattern under study. The results for membership (model
2) are more interesting. The entry effect now represents the group that was uninvolved in the first
wave, started to participate between the first and the second wave, and prolonged participation
between the second and third wave (pattern 011). The immediate effect (difference T1-T2) for this
group is somewhat larger (b = 0.296) than the effect we found in Table 3 without the distinction
between prolonged and short-term participation. Table 4 also shows the reason why. The entry effect
in Table 3 (pattern 01) included two groups: those who would decide to remain a member (pattern
011 in Table 4) and those who would decide to quit a year later (pattern 010). The latter group shows
no trust effect at all in Table 4 (b = −0.018).
Models 3 and 4 in Table 4 focus on the development of trust over a somewhat longer period (two
years). The results are different from the previous ones. Over a period of two years, the positive entry
effect of membership on generalized trust diminishes and drops below significance levels. In other
words, the effect of participation on trust was only experienced by those who prolonged their
participation, and it seems to have been a temporary boost. The significant trust effect among those
who entered between the second and third wave of measurement (pattern 001) in model 4 is in line
with the idea of a temporary, immediate increase in trust. Interestingly, this group already experi-
enced a (nonsignificant) increase in trust before they became a member (b = 0.242; see model 2),
which may be an indication of reversed causality.
No Differences Between Types of Voluntary Associations
Table 5 displays average trust levels of individuals with different levels of activity in different
types of associations. A clear overall pattern emerges: the differences between nonmembers and
passive members3 were generally larger than the differences between passive and active members.
Active and passive members were (roughly) equally trusting in most cases. There is no evidence that
3 Note that passive membership may have a different meaning depending on the type of association; e.g., in the case of
environmental organizations, it probably refers to giving financial support only, while in the case of sports clubs, passive
members could also be former active members who are—for whatever reason—currently inactive.
Table 4. Change in Trust by Transition (deviations from reference group and standard errors; SHP pooled)
Trust (Δ One Year) Trust (Δ Two Years)
Volunteering Membership Volunteering Membership
Three-wave transitions
Stay uninvolved (000) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Entry (011) 0.129 0.296* −0.157 0.222
(0.135) (0.132) (0.151) (0.152)
Exit (100) 0.110 0.044 0.123 −0.037
(0.129) (0.153) (0.144) (0.172)
Stay involved (111) 0.060 0.162* 0.024 0.146
(0.053) (0.068) (0.073) (0.090)
Late entry (001) −0.002 0.242 −0.016 0.361*
(0.133) (0.156) (0.149) (0.174)
Entry and exit (010) 0.115 −0.018 −0.075 0.121
(0.142) (0.161) (0.160) (0.185)
N (obs/persons) 5,291/2,247 5,293/2,248 5,297/2,252 5,299/2,253
Note. Models are controlled for equation number, education, (having a) partner, health, and (being) employed.
The patterns of the transition groups correspond to: (1) participation and (0) no participation in the different waves; e.g.,
001 means that the respondent started to participate between the second and third wave. *p < .05; **p < .01.
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engagement in leisure associations yields greater effects than engagement in other associations.
Additionally, we performed regression analyses similar to Table 3 (entry vs. noninvolved) to see
whether entering specific types of associations would boost generalized trust (bottom row of
Table 5). In line with the descriptive results in the first three rows of Table 5, we found no social-
ization effects of membership on trust.
The fact that differences between nonmembers and passive members are larger than differences
between passive and active members also speaks against positive socialization effects of civic
engagement. Active members should display higher levels of trust because they are more likely to
have positive social interaction and cooperative experiences.
Differences Between Countries?
In order to assess the generalizability of our findings, we also analyzed the effect of civic
engagement on trust in other countries. Next to the data from Switzerland in our main analyses, we
analyzed data of panel studies from the United Kingdom (BHPS), the Netherlands (LISS and
GINPS), and Australia (HILDA). The results are presented in Table 6.
The results from the different panel studies are fairly consistent. In the between-regressions, we
found strong positive effects between membership and volunteering on the one hand and trust on the
other, but we found much weaker relations in the fixed-effects and first-difference models. The
strongest causal effect in the table was the volunteering effect in the United Kingdom. This effect was
not detected in the data from Australia and the Netherlands. All the other effects were not significant
and very small (standardized effects < .05), regardless of the type of analysis.
Discussion and Conclusions
Putnam (2000) argues that “the causal arrows among civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty,
and social trust are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti” (p. 137). For some researchers, this is a
reason to combine measures of civic engagement and trust into one scale or factor, which is usually
labeled “social capital.” In the current article, we followed the opposite approach and attempted to
disentangle the spaghetti by performing several strict empirical tests of the proposed causal effect of
civic participation on generalized trust. In summary, our findings offer little support for the idea that
civic engagement plays an important role in the creation of generalized trust. We found some
evidence of small, short-term effects, but those effects turned out not to last in the Swiss data. So we
conclude that civic engagement brings trusting individuals together, but it does not enhance gener-
alized trust in the long run. In other words, voluntary associations seem to be “pools of democracy”
rather than “schools of democracy” (Van der Meer & Van Ingen, 2009).
Table 5. Average Trust by Type of Association and Type of Participation (SHP; pooled)
Local or
Parents
Sports or
Leisure
Culture Syndicate Political
Party
Environment Charitable
Organization
Women Tenants
Rights
Not a member 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9
Passive member 6.31 6.11 6.51 6.31 6.51 6.61 6.41 6.51 6.01
Active member 6.4 6.22 6.5 6.1 6.4 6.3 6.52 6.6 5.9
First-difference
effect any
membership3 (SE)
0.030 0.073 0.001 −0.076 0.134 0.115 0.076 0.091 0.239
(0.099) (0.076) (0.076) (0.101) (0.131) (0.088) (0.069) (0.122) (0.125)
1Average passive > nonmember (t-test; p < .01 [one-sided]).
2Average active > passive member (t-test; p < .01 [one-sided]).
3Control variables are similar to Table 3.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
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So why is there no causal relation between civic engagement and trust while there is consider-
able correlation between the two? In the theoretical section, we already discussed several possible
reasons. We did not find support for the idea that trust does not change much during one’s life. On
the contrary, our respondents showed substantial within-person variation in trust. It seems more
likely that civic engagement and trust are correlated because they are part of the same “social
syndrome”: those who subscribe to prosocial values, who have good social skills, and who are
generally outgoing are more likely to be both more civically engaged and trusting.
To be sure, we do not mean to say that civic engagement is unimportant; it means that we should
start thinking about the relation between trust and participation in a different way. Societies may
benefit from domains in which trusting and involved citizens are brought together; many forms of
political and nonpolitical collective action require cooperation between citizens of this type, such as
direct governance in which voluntary associations play a role in policy making, or informal civic
initiatives, such as efforts to clean the neighborhood or raise money for charity (see Fung, 2003 for
a discussion of how associations enhance democracy). In this sense, voluntary associations can be
important recruitment bases for “good citizens.”
Table 6. Civic Engagement and Generalized Trust in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Australia (regression
coefficients and standard errors)
Between
Regression
Fixed-Effects
Regression
First-Difference
Regression
United Kingdom (BHPS):1
Membership 0.097** 0.006 −0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010)
Volunteering 0.182** 0.033** 0.049**
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
Netherlands (LISS):2
Membership 0.174** 0.011 0.048
(0.011) (0.014) (0.159)
Volunteering 0.558** 0.046 0.017
(0.030) (0.027) (0.099)
Netherlands (GINPS):3
Volunteering 0.226** −0.014 0.018
(0.026) (0.031) (0.047)
Australia (HILDA):4
Volunteering 0.485** 0.034 0.039
(0.031) (0.028) (0.057)
1Fifteen waves, interval one year. Generalized trust: range 0–1; mean 0.38; SD 0.49.
Membership mean 0.82. Volunteering mean 0.21.
Standardized membership effect −0.01; Standardized volunteering effect 0.10.
2Two waves, interval one year. Generalized trust: range 0–10; mean 6.07; SD 2.11.
Membership mean 2.69. Volunteering mean 0.37.
Standardized membership effect 0.03; Standardized volunteering effect 0.01.
3Four waves, interval two years. Generalized trust: range 1–5; mean 3.14; SD 0.74.
Volunteering mean: 0.42.
Standardized volunteering effect 0.02.
4Three waves, interval one year. Generalized trust: range 1–7; mean 4.68; SD 1.39.
Volunteering mean: 0.18.
Standardized volunteering effect 0.03.
Note. The computed means are overall means (across all waves). The standardized effects are based on the first-difference
regression, and calculated by dividing the coefficient by one standard deviation of the dependent variable (i.e., they are
standardized dummy effects; they are not fully standardized). In other words, they indicate the change in standard
deviations trust as a result of becoming a member or volunteer.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
van Ingen and Bekkers14
Our study does provide a warning against considering civic engagement as an antidote for
societal issues or democratic deficits, such as a lack of trust or lack of political involvement and
interest. Although there are more outcomes that need to be studied besides generalized trust, caution
seems to be needed in regarding voluntary associations and the like as a special kind of social
networks. Unfortunately, our data did not enable us to examine this matter thoroughly, but future
research may want to assess to what extent the social networks of voluntary associations are
heterogeneous and to what extent activities are cooperative and sentiments positive. What we tested
was a proposed consequence of these characteristics, and based on that test, we are inclined to think
that at least some of the premises about voluntary associations are implausible.
A few shortcomings of our study deserve to be discussed. First, measurement error is a potential
threat to our conclusions. The validity of the measurement of trust has been criticized by several
authors (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; Miller & Mitamura, 2003; Uslaner, 2002).
To the extent that this error is stable over time, for instance, because respondents have an idiosyncratic
interpretation of the survey items that they apply in each wave, this source of error is subsumed in the
unit effects that fall out of the equation in the fixed-effects (and first-difference) models. In the
alternative case of errors that vary from wave to wave, the question is whether these errors are
correlated with trust and participation and in which direction. If the errors are random they do not bias
the estimates. But if the errors are correlated systematically with trust and participation, the effects of
participation on trust are biased. At present, there is no way to check whether this is the case.
Second, another problem that threatens the validity of our conclusions is selective attrition.
Survey participation itself is a form of volunteering that depends on trust (Abraham, Helms, &
Presser, 2009). This problem poses itself more prominently in a panel study in which participation
is required in multiple waves of the survey. The least trusting people will be the least likely to
continue participation over a large number of waves. It would probably require a full study to try to
assess the possible bias resulting from this selective attrition, which is beyond our current purpose.
Our preliminary idea is that respondents who do not participate and who experience a decrease of
trust are more likely to drop out of the survey than others, and this may overestimate the growth of
trust in the control group. As a consequence, the participation effect is underestimated (as it is the
difference in trust growth between the two groups). However, we are convinced that the large sample
sizes of the datasets we used provided us with sufficient statistical power to find small effects as well,
compensating for the somewhat smaller effect size.
Despite these shortcomings, we are confident about the validity of our findings, especially since
our empirical tests included many variations in research design, such as different kinds of civic
engagement, different samples, and different timing of the effect. The results were consistent across
these variations: the causal effect of civic engagement on trust was either nonsignificant or small. In
our view, to look at effect size is more important than to look at significance levels. The large samples
that were studied increase the chances of finding significant but very small effects. There appears to
be only one finding that is not fully in line with the other results: although its effect size is still small,
the effect of volunteering in the United Kingdom was considerably larger than any other effect we
found. It is beyond the scope of the current study to explain why this is the case, but examining what
is special about volunteering in the United Kingdom deserves to be a task of future research.
As indicated in one of the previous sections, there are plausible arguments to support the finding
that civic engagement is not an important breeding ground for trust. For most people, civic engage-
ment is not an important part of everyday life. And the fellow participants with whom interactions
take place are usually very similar in terms of social background, not representing “people in
general.” As a result, civic participation may further trust in fellow participants, but that trust is
unlikely to convert into generalized trust.
What are the implications of this conclusion for future research? There are several possibilities,
of which we briefly outline two. First, our conclusions are based on (averages of) the general
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populations of the countries we studied. Strictly speaking, our findings do not exclude the possibility
that civic engagement breeds trust for small segments of those populations. For example, immigrants
who recently moved to a country may enhance the trust in their fellow citizens by extensive
participation in voluntary associations. In addition, it is possible that adolescents, whose attitudes
and values are more open to change, experience greater effects of civic engagement. In other words,
future studies may want to examine whether there are special circumstances under which civic
engagement does breed trust. Second, the attention may be shifted to other determinants of gener-
alized trust, such as education or upbringing, or life course events. Our research indicated that there
was a reasonable variation of trust within respondents, and it seems unlikely that this would all be
random variation. Finally, in line with our plea for a different way of thinking about civic engage-
ment and trust, future studies may want to examine the mobilization function of voluntary associa-
tions more extensively. What are the opportunities of having pools of involved and trusting citizens,
and what kinds of collective action can be facilitated? With this article, we hope to stimulate further
studies that enhance our knowledge of the causes and consequences of participation in voluntary
associations and similar social networks.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to E. J. van Ingen, Department of
Sociology, Tilburg University, P.O. box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail:
e.j.vaningen@uvt.nl
REFERENCES
Abraham, K. G., Helms, S., & Presser, S. (2009). How social processes distort measurement: The impact of survey
nonresponse on estimates of volunteer work in the United States. American Journal of Sociology, 114(4), 1129–1165.
Allison, P. D. (2009). Fixed effects regression models. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Alvarez-Díaz, A., González, L., & Radcliff, B. (2010). The politics of happiness: On the political determinants of quality of
life in the American states. Journal of Politics, 72(3), 894–905.
Anheier, H., & Kendall, J. (2002). Interpersonal trust and voluntary associations: Examining three approaches. British Journal
of Sociology, 53(3), 343–362.
Bekkers, R. (2012). Trust and volunteering: Selection or causation? Evidence from a 4 year panel study. Political Behavior,
32(2): 225–247.
Bekkers, R., & Bowman, W. (2009). The relationship between confidence in charitable organizations and volunteering
revisited. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 38(5), 884–897.
Bekkers, R., & Schuyt, T. (2008). And who is your neighbor? Explaining denominational differences in charitable giving and
volunteering in the Netherlands. Review of Religious Research, 50(1), 74–96.
Binder, J., Zagefka, H., Brown, R., Funke, F., Kessler, T., Mummendey, A., et al. (2009). Does contact reduce prejudice or
does prejudice reduce contact? A longitudinal test of the contact hypothesis among majority and minority groups in three
European countries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(4), 843–856.
Bjørnskov, C. (2006). The multiple facets of social capital. European Journal of Political Economy, 22, 22–40.
Bleidorn, W., Kandler, C., Riemann, R., Angleitner, A., & Spinath, F. M. (2009). Patterns and sources of adult personality
development: Growth curve analyses of the NEO PI-R scales in a longitudinal twin study. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 91(1), 142–155.
Brann, P., & Foddy, M. (1987). Trust and the consumption of a deteriorating common resource. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 31, 615–630.
Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital. American Journal
of Political Science, 41(3), 999–1023.
Brewer, M. B., & Gaertner, S. L. (2001). Toward reduction of prejudice: Intergroup contact and social categorization. In R.
Brown & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Brown, E. (1999). The scope of volunteer activity and public service. Law and Contemporary Problems, 62(4), 17–42.
van Ingen and Bekkers16
Caputo, R. (2009). Religious capital and intergenerational transmission of volunteering as correlates of civic engagement.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 38(6), 983–1002.
Claibourn, M. P., & Martin, P. S. (2000). Trusting and joining? An empirical test of the reciprocal nature of social capital.
Political Behavior, 22(4), 267–291.
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
De Cremer, D., Snyder, M., & Dewitte, S. (2001). The less I trust, the less I contribute (or not)?” The effects of trust,
accountability and self-monitoring in social dilemmas. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 93–107.
Dearmon, J., & Grier, K. (2009). Trust and development. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71, 210–220.
Delhey, J., & Newton, K. (2003). Who trusts? The origins of social trust in seven societies. European Societies, 5(2), 93–137.
Ferres, N., Connell, J., & Travaglione, A. (2004). Co-worker trust as a social catalyst for constructive employee attitudes.
Journal of Managerial Psychology, 19(6), 608–622.
Flanagan, C. A., & Gallay, L. (2008). Adolescent development of trust. Circle Working Paper 61.
Flanagan, C. A., & Stout, M. (2010). Developmental patterns of social trust between early and late adolescence: Age and
school climate effects. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 20(3), 748–73.
Fujiwara, T., & Kawachi, I. (2008a). A prospective study of individual-level social capital and major depression in the United
States. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 62, 627–633.
Fujiwara, T., & Kawachi, I. (2008b). Social capital and health a study of adult twins in the U.S. American Journal of
Preventive Medicine, 35(2), 139–144.
Fung, A. (2003). Associations and democracy: Between theories, hopes, and realities. Annual Review of Sociology, 29,
515–539.
Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D. I., Scheinkman, J. A., & Soutter, C. L. (2000). Measuring trust. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115(3), 811–846.
Gross, K., Aday, S., & Brewer, P. R. (2004). A panel study of media effects on political and social trust after September 11,
2001. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 9(4), 49–73.
Halpern, D. (2001). Moral values, social trust and inequality: Can values explain crime? British Journal of Criminology, 41,
236–251.
Helliwell, J. F. (2003). How’s life? Combining individual and national variables to explain subjective well-being. Economic
Modeling, 20(2), 331–360.
Hiraishi, K., Yamagata, S., Shikishima, C., & Ando, J. (2008). Maintenance of genetic variation in personality through control
of mental mechanisms: A test of trust, extraversion, and agreeableness. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29, 79–85.
Jennings, M. K., & Stoker, L. (2004). Social trust and civic engagement across time and generations. Acta Politica, 39(4),
342–379.
John, P. (2005). The contribution of volunteering, trust, and networks to educational performance. Policy Studies Journal,
33(4), 635–656.
Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about others. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 66–91.
Kerr, N. L., & Harris, S. E. (1996). Why do cooperators cooperate? Efficacy as a moderator of social motive effects. In W.
B. G. Liebrand & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Frontiers in social dilemmas research (pp. 101–116). Berlin, Ger.: Springer.
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic pay-off? A cross country investigation. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112, 1251–1288.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Trust in large organizations. American Economic
Review, 87, 333–338.
Lipps, O. (2007). Attrition in the Swiss houshold panel. Methoden—Daten—Analysen, 1(1), 45–68.
McPherson, J. M., & Smith-Lovin, L. (1987). Homophily in voluntary organizations: Status distance and the composition of
face-to-face groups. American Sociological Review, 52(3), 370–379.
Miller, A. S., & Mitamura, T. (2003). Are surveys on trust trustworthy? Social Psychology Quarterly, 66(1), 62–70.
Nannestad, P. (2008). What have we learned about generalized trust, if anything? Annual Review of Political Science, 11,
413–436.
Newton, K. (1999). Social capital and democracy in modern Europe. In J. V. Deth (Ed.), Social capital and European
democracy (pp. 3–24). London, UK: Routledge.
Parks, C. D., Henager, R. F., & Scamahorn, S. D. (1996). Trust and reactions to messages of intent in social dilemmas. Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 40, 133–150.
Paxton, P. (2007). Association memberships and generalized trust: A multilevel model across 31 countries. Social Forces,
86(1), 47–76.
Generalized Trust through Civic Engagement? 17
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 90(5), 751–783.
Pichler, F., & Wallace, C. (2007). Patterns of formal and informal social capital in Europe. European Sociological Review,
23(4), 423–435.
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Roberts, B. W., & DelVecchio, W. F. (2000). The rank-order consistency of personality traits from childhood to old age: A
quantitative review of longitudinal studies. Psychological Bulletin, 126(1), 3–25.
Roberts, B. W., & Mroczek, D. (2008). Personality trait change in adulthood. Current Directions in Psychological Science,
17(1), 31–35.
Rosenblum, N. L. (1998). Membership and morals: The personal uses of pluralism in America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Rosenfeld, R., Messner, S. F., & Baumer, E. P. (2001). Social capital and homicide. Social Forces, 80(1), 283–309.
Roßteutscher, S. (2005). The lure of the associative elixir. In S. Roßteutscher (Ed.), Democracy and the role of associations:
Political, organizational and social contexts (pp. 3–24). London: Routledge.
Rothbart, M. (2001). Category dynamics and the modification of outgroup stereotypes. In R. Brown & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.),
Blackwell handbook of social psychology (pp. 45–64). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Rotter, J. B. (1967). A new scale for the measurement of interpersonal trust. Journal of Personality, 35, 651–665.
Shikishima, C., Hiraishi, K., & Ando, J. (2006). Genetic and environmental influences on general trust: A test of a theory
of trust with behavioral genetic and evolutionary psychological approaches. Japanese Journal of Social Psychology,
22(1), 48–57.
Sønderskov, K. M. (2010). Does generalized social trust lead to associational membership? Unravelling a bowl of well-tossed
spaghetti. European Sociological Review, 27(4), 419–434.
Stolle, D. (1998). Why do bowling and singing matter? Group characteristics, membership, and generalized trust. Political
Psychology, 19(3), 497–525.
Stolle, D. (2001a). Clubs and congregations: The benefits of joining an association. In K. S. Cook (Ed.), Trust in society
(pp. 202–244). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Stolle, D. (2001b). “Getting to trust”: An analysis of the importance of institutions, families, personal experiences and group
membership. In P. Dekker & E. Uslaner (Eds.), Social capital and participation in everyday life (pp. 118–133). London,
UK: Routledge.
Stolle, D., & Rochon, T. R. (1998). Are all associations alike? Membership diversity, associational type and the creation of
social capital. American Behavioral Scientist, 42, 47–65.
Sturgis, P., Patulny, R., & Allum, N. (2009). Re-evaluating the Individual level causes of trust: A panel data analysis. Working
Paper, Essex University.
Sturgis, P., Read, S., Hatemi, P. K., Zhu, G., Trull, T., Wright, M. J., et al. (2010). A genetic basis for social trust? Political
Behavior, 32, 205–230.
Swiss Household Panel. (2010). Individual questionnaire Wave 10 [Electronic Version]. Retrieved from http://
www.swisspanel.ch/spip.php?rubrique137&lang=en
Tocqueville, A. D. (2000). Democracy in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published
1835–1840)
Uslaner, E. (2002). The moral foundations of trust. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Van der Meer, T., & Van Ingen, E. (2009). Schools of democracy? Disentangling the relationship between civic participation
and political action in 17 European countries. European Journal of Political Research, 40(2), 281–308.
Van Ingen, E. (2008). Social participation revisited: Disentangling and explaining period, life-cycle and cohort effects. Acta
Sociologica, 51(2), 103–121.
Voorpostel, M., Tillmann, R., Lebert, F., Weaver, B., Kuhn, U., Lipps, O., et al. (2009). Swiss Household Panel user guide
(1999—2008), Wave 10, December 2009. Lausanne, Switz.: FORS.
Warren, M. E. (2001). Democracy and association. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Welch, M. R., Sikkink, D., & Loveland, M. T. (2007). The radius of trust: Religion, social embeddedness and trust in
strangers. Social Forces, 86(1), 23–46.
Whiteley, P. (2000). Economic growth and social capital. Political Studies, 48(3), 443–466.
Wilson, J. (2000). Volunteering. Annual Review of Sociology, 26(1), 215–240.
Wollebæk, D., & Strømsnes, K. (2008). Voluntary associations, trust, and civic engagement: A multilevel approach. Nonprofit
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 37(2), 249–263.
Wrightsman, L. S. (1992). Assumptions about human nature (2 ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
van Ingen and Bekkers18
